Last week, in discussing
leadership, I suggested that a successful leader requires the trust of the people he is leading. Trust, and the lack of it, have both been in the news a lot recently. We rely on the bravery and objectivity of our journalists reporting in Ukraine. We trust them. On the other hand, we learn of the untrustworthy nature of the news which reaches the population in Russia.
Trust can be directed at or removed from institutions such as the police or a political party, or even from things, such as a dodgy-looking wooden bridge. But as a concept it is most at home in personal relationships and it is in that kind of context that I'll begin. What constitutes trust, when should we trust, and what is the value of trust?
Sometimes people are criticised for being too trusting. They are criticised for being too trusting because not everyone is trustworthy, and only a trustworthy person is the appropriate object of the attitude of trust. For example, followers of the
Peanuts cartoons will remember that Charlie Brown always trusts Lucy to hold the ball for him to kick. She never does, so he always falls on his back. Notoriously, relationships can suffer if one partner is too trusting of the other's stated resolve to give up drink, drugs, gambling etc. There are therefore two immediate and linked questions: what are the elements of trustworthiness, and how are we to describe the attitude of trust?
Trustworthiness is constituted by a number of properties. Many of these can be summed up if we say that trustworthiness requires both reliability and the appropriate competence. A trustworthy person has a record of carrying out what has been required and also a competence to do so. For example, you might want a friend or a neighbour to look after your plants or feed your guinea pigs while you are on holiday. You hope that they will know what to do and that they are reliable enough to follow your instructions.
The trustworthy person is likely also to have a motive for carrying out what has been asked. For example, there may be an assumed reciprocity such as in a baby-sitting arrangement. Or the motive may simply be out of family loyalty or friendship with the trustor.
The second question concerns the attitude of trust. The attitude of trust suggests a degree of vulnerability but at the same time requires realistic judgement: 'I am relying on you to book the tickets'. The person trusting (the 'trustor') is vulnerable because having the tickets matters and being aware of human fallibility judges that a reminder is not out of place because the trustee (the person trusted) might just forget. In this example, the trustee's failure to book the tickets will result in disappointment, but in more serious examples a failure might amount to a betrayal.
So far then I have suggested that the attitude of trust requires judgement but at the same leaves the person trusting vulnerable. Nevertheless, the attitude is appropriate if the person trusted – the 'trustee' – is trustworthy, where that involves competence and motive.
Can it ever be appropriate to trust someone whom you don't know to be trustworthy? Well, sometimes you may have no option. For example, as a visitor in a strange town, you may have lost your way so you ask a passer-by for directions. I recall many years ago I was lost in New York and asked a passer-by whether he knew the way to such and such a street. He said 'yes' and walked on! But that was unlucky, not everyone is in such a hurry as a New Yorker. Most people will be pleased to direct you and you assume their trustworthiness without knowing anything about them. I shall return to that point.
There is a second situation in which it might be appropriate to put your trust in someone even if you don't have an assurance of trustworthiness. The situation is one of what a colleague of mine called 'therapeutic trust'. An example here might be when you trust your ill-behaved teenage children not to have wild parties while you are away. You assume, well, you hope, that having been trusted they will rise to the occasion and reward your trust with trustworthiness. Trust here would or might be morally therapeutic. But in all cases of therapeutic trust you make yourself more vulnerable than you are when the trustee is known to be trustworthy.
Broader social and political issues also require trust. I remember a politician saying that he had been canvassing in a certain area. He had knocked on a door which was then opened half an inch. He said: 'I'm your X-party candidate. You can trust me because I come from round here'. The door was firmly shut in his face with the words: 'I wouldn't trust anyone who comes from round here'. Even if we leave aside the point that not everyone wants to listen to a political candidate on the doorstep, the loss of trust indicated is sad. To understand why lack of trust is unfortunate we need to consider the value of trust.
Trust obviously makes possible co-operation with others. Consider first commercial situations. In his interesting book
Sapiens, the author – Yuval Noah Harari – makes the point that our whole system of using money depends on trust. He writes: 'Trust is the raw material from which all types of money are minted...
Money is the most universal and most efficient system of mutual trust ever devised' (his italics). No doubt something similar can be said of business transactions of all kinds, which is why there is huge unease when corruption is uncovered, even when the excuse is: 'I haven't broken any rules'.
Many other institutions also depend on trust. For example, if you turn up at A&E with a broken wrist, you have no way of checking the qualifications of the doctor attending to you. You trust the doctor because you assume that the NHS would not have appointed him/her without checking their qualifications and experience. If, as occasionally happens, someone hoodwinks the system, there is an outcry.
We can be reasonably confident that, granted the very rare examples of individual incompetence, the NHS can be trusted because those working in the system are well-trained and highly motivated. In a similar way, we assume teachers are trustworthy in terms of the relevant competences as well as the moral and personal characteristics necessary for imparting knowledge and encouraging pupils.
Our system of policing also depends on trust, but at present there seems doubt as to how justifiable our trust is. There have been questions for many years about endemic racism, and now sexism and worse seem to be rife. Trust in the police is important for the smooth running of society.
Trust is crucial for the development of knowledge of all kinds. You must believe you can rely on other members of your team, and other researchers worldwide, to provide accurate data. And nowadays false information on the internet creates a climate of distrust in which science is disbelieved and politics degraded.
I have touched on various contexts in which trustworthiness is important. These contexts suggest that trust and trustworthiness are valuable because they underpin successful co-operation. This gives them an instrumental value. But just as important are the possibilities which trust creates for secure attachments and long-term relationships. Important among these is obviously the parent-child relationship.
In conclusion, I wish to assert that if we consider the variety of contexts to which trust is essential it is plausible to say that trust is basic to the practice of morality, the joy of human relationships, and indeed to the continuing existence of society. That makes it not just an instrumental value but a foundational value.
Robin Downie is Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow
