'Exploitation' is a familiar term in media commentary. It is very commonly used when an older person, usually male, makes use of someone's vulnerability (usually young female) for their own ends (usually sexual). The vulnerability may be a need for affection or the hope of improving an impoverished life. Such common contexts where the word is used comply with dictionary definitions which most often identify exploitation as 'making use of someone or something unjustly or unethically for their own advantage'. It is a moot point, which I shall return to, whether dictionaries are right in depicting exploitation as always or necessarily unethical.
But before getting on to that, it is worth noting the range of contexts in which unethical exploitation takes place. A common context is tabloid journalism. If the Prince of Wales, for example, makes any unguarded or off-the-cuff remark which is overheard or betrayed, you can be sure that newspapers will exploit it. But the minor exploitation of the Prince is as nothing compared to the life and death of Princess Diana, which was a gold mine for tabloid exploitation. Indeed, it is the prurient interest of the public in the exploitation of public figures which keeps the tabloid press in business. A public interest justification? Aye, that'll be right.
But are dictionaries correct when they build into it their definition that exploitation is unethical? It is true that the larger and more scholarly dictionaries note other uses of the word, but more recent dictionaries reflect common usage when they record that exploitation is morally wrong. Some philosophers would disagree.
Exploitation is discussed early in philosophical literature. In Plato's
Republic, Thrasymachus, a Sophist, dismisses the idea of justice. He argues that it is a sham. Justice, he thinks, is something devised so that the rich and powerful can exploit the weak.
The argument is taken much further in another Dialogue – the
Gorgias. The theme of the
Gorgias is power. A central character in the
Gorgias is Callicles. Callicles is a young Athenian politician who uses a distinction between what exists by nature and what exists by human law and custom to justify exploitation. Laws or conventions, he argues, are devised by the weak to force others to behave in ways which benefit the weak. But he points out that Nature reveals, for example in the behaviour of animals, that it is right that the strong should exploit the weak. In Nature, he argues, exploitation is true justice. He claims that this is also what should apply in human society.
I'll not take up here the very interesting arguments in the Dialogue for and against that position but note that a different version of it is adopted by Nietzsche. Nietzsche is unsparing in his criticism of Christianity as 'slave morality'. In
Beyond Good and Evil he writes: 'The Christian faith is from the beginning sacrifice: sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit, at the same time enslavement and self-mockery, self-mutilation'. You get the gist – Christianity is for the weak, but he is for the strong, free spirits who can exploit the weak.
The most powerful discussion of exploitation, at least in economic spheres, is provided by Marx. His argument, crudely and briefly, goes something like this. In our society, a capitalist one, it is standard to believe that it is entirely just for us to buy and sell commodities at whatever price the free market will bear. It should be noted that Marx holds that 'commodities' would include people's labouring capacities. Since the rate of wages is largely determined to the advantage of employers by their ownership of the means of production, he argues that they are in a strong bargaining position.
On the other hand, the fact that workers are propertyless in that respect puts them in a weaker bargaining position. The situation, according to Marxists, is therefore clearly exploitative. In other words, the employers are in fact adopting the position of Callicles.
Since the period when Marx was writing, the bargaining position of workers has been much improved: social conditions are better and industrial legislation exists which legalises strikes provided ballots are held and other rules followed. Some of this legislation was weakened during the time of Mrs Thatcher, and currently there are government plans further to limit the power of workers to strike. These plans can be seen as attempts to increase the bargaining power of employers, and will no doubt be justified as being in the public interest. Are we, the public, condoning exploitation?
Interestingly, the section of the public which is likely to suffer most from present government policies – the Red Wall voters – remain supporters of that same government. Nietzsche again: He writes in his aphorism 156 in
Beyond Good and Evil:
Madness is something rare in individuals – but in groups, parties, peoples, ages, it is the rule.
Of course, it is sometimes said that the bosses of large unions are the Callicles of the contemporary world. They have the bargaining power to make demands whereas workers in the private sector, pensioners and many others in weaker unions, such as the Musicians' Union, have no option but to accept the economic situation which the more powerful union bosses put them in. On the other hand, membership of the unions has fallen and their bargaining power is correspondingly weak. We can expect to see all this played out in the winter months.
Sometimes poets get it right, as in the poem by Roger Woddis (1917-1993) entitled
Ethics for Everyman. I'll quote the verses relevant to my theme:
Company output 'soars'
Wages of course 'explode';
Profits deserve applause,
Pay-claims, the criminal code.
Daily the Church declares
Betting shops are a curse;
Gambling with stocks and shares
Enlarges the national purse.
Workers are absentees,
Businessmen relax,
Different as chalk and cheese;
Social morality
Has a duality –
One for each side of the tracks.
All this is quite controversial stuff. We certainly don't like to think of ourselves as exploitative.
But there are many contexts in which, contrary to the dictionary, we are happy with the idea of exploitation. For example, Andy Murray might realise that an opponent is not good at returning shots near the net and exploit that weakness. Indeed, in games generally, winning may be partly a matter of discovering and exploiting an opponent's weak points. Nothing ethically wrong there.
Again, in parliamentary debate, say at Prime Minister's Question Time, we expect questions from the Opposition to expose and exploit weaknesses in a government's position. Or in court, the defence counsel will exploit any weakness in the prosecution's case. In other words, there are many contexts in which exploitation is acceptable or indeed desirable. So the dictionaries have not got it right when they build an adverse moral judgement into the idea of exploitation.
Some years ago, I recall struggling along the crowded pavement in Byres Road during Glasgow's West End Festival. There was a procession of women on the road with assorted placards but all with variants of: Men exploit Women. I happened to be trying to pass a young couple wrapped round each other and I heard the woman say to her boyfriend: 'Exploit me!' No comment.
Robin Downie is Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow
