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Answers to citizenship questions:
Onora O’Neill
A recurring theme in a number of my SR articles has been the decline in public trust. The decline can be seen in attitudes to public figures, occupational groups and institutions of various kinds (parliament, banks, the law, churches).
One of the first people to comment on this trend was Onora O’Neill who gave the 2002 Reith lectures under the title ‘A Question of Trust’. She is a distinguished Cambridge philosopher, a cross-bench member of the House of Lords and has recently been appointed as the next chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. As someone right at the heart of the British establishment, she is presumably concerned about developments that might be socially destabilising. In the absence of a basic framework of trust, some of the assumptions of a democratic society begin to look rather shaky.
It was with keen interest, therefore, that I tuned in to BBC Radio 4 last week to hear her latest thoughts on the subject. The title of her short talk was ‘Trustworthiness before Trust’. She argued that the question we should be addressing is not ‘How can we restore trust?’, but ‘How can we make it easier to judge trustworthiness?’.
She was sceptical of the value of generic surveys such as those that ask people whether they would trust various occupational groups (doctors, teachers, judges, journalists, etc.) to tell the truth. A more nuanced approach was required which focused on judgements about particular cases. Moreover, she suggested that most people were quite good at making such judgements and were able to discriminate between different categories of trustworthiness. For example, they might trust a teacher to teach mathematics but not to drive the school mini-bus. They were unlikely to trust a company which dealt with complaints by referring customers to a so-called ‘Helpline’, where staff worked to a prepared script, or which communicated using evasive, over-complex language.
She also had doubts about the extent to which mechanisms to ensure ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ would bring about improvements, citing the example of a midwife who complained that the amount of time she spent on paperwork – in order to meet demands for accountability – meant that she had less time to devote to expectant mothers.
Bureaucratic systems may be necessary but what really matters are individual judgements of the competence, honesty and reliability of staff. She might have added that some accountability mechanisms seem designed to cover the backs of senior managers rather than ensure good service for customers. In my experience, the more boastful organisations are about their ‘transparency’, the more likely it is to suggest the triumph of PR spin over substance.
I felt there were two things missing from Baroness O’Neill’s analysis. The first was any explicit reference to standards of morality in society as a whole. It can be argued that the setting up of regulatory mechanisms and codes of conduct – which is often presented as an indication that issues of trust are being taken seriously – is, in fact, evidence that people can no longer be trusted to act on the basis of conscience or principle. This, in turn, opens up the possibility of a general decline in ethical standards, perhaps linked to selfish individualism and the dominance of material values.
Recent cases would suggest that people occupying leadership roles in public and private organisations are no less likely to act in untrustworthy ways than ordinary folk: indeed the authority they possess, and the benefits that might accrue from dishonourable actions, can act as incentives.
This leads to the second omission – the absence of any discussion of the power dimension of trust. In many situations the parties to events which may involve questions of trust are not equal in terms of knowledge and experience (eg doctor/patient, lawyer/client relationships). This calls for particular sensitivity in the giving of advice and recommending courses of action. If the power of the expert is exercised in an unfair way (eg for financial gain rather than for the benefit of the patient/client), that would undermine the basis of a professional transaction which requires trust. The level of scepticism about the procedures of professional bodies which claim to investigate complaints against members is disturbingly high.
I am less sanguine than Baroness O’Neill about the current situation. While her approach is quite useful in explaining individual cases involving judgements of trust, it does not address deeper issues affecting the integrity of major institutions (including the House of Lords) and the way in which important public figures are regarded. If the leaders cannot be trusted, what effect does that have on the actions of ordinary citizens?
I used to think that the more responsible sections of a free press and an inquiring academic community would ensure that disturbing social trends would be subject to sharp critical interrogation. But both these agencies have themselves been affected by the decline in trust. As Frederic Raphael remarked in a recent book review: ‘The sad truth about the 20th century is that it proved that, given the right incentives in the form of kudos and emoluments, intellectuals will become fluent in any ideology, whether religious, political or aesthetic’. If that is indeed the case, where is the restoration of trust likely to come from?
Walter Humes held professorships at the universities of Aberdeen, Strathclyde and West of Scotland and is now a visiting professor
of education at the University of Stirling
